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Abstract
Sex workers receive a price premium for unprotected sex. Research has inferred
that the source of this premium is a compensating differential for STI risk. I in-
troduce a compensating differential for pregnancy risk as a novel source through
a simple model that incorporates both STI risk and pregnancy risk. I empirically
test this using a rich panel dataset of 19,041 sexual transactions by 192 sex work-
ers in Busia, Kenya collected during 2005 and 2006. I run sex worker-fixed effects
regressions and find that compensating differentials for STI risk and pregnancy risk
are sources of the price premium for unprotected sex. The price premium for preg-
nancy risk is USD 10, and USD 2 for STI risk (24 percent of average price). I also
test for clients’ disutility for condoms, another competing theory, and find that it
is not a statistically significant source of the premium. Identifying and estimating
sources of the price premium for unprotected sex will allow policymakers to imple-
ment interventions that will reduce both the supply and the demand for unprotected
sex.
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1 Introduction
Sex workers receive a price premium each time they have unprotected sex. This price
premium has been documented in India (Rao et al. 2003), in Mexico (Gertler et al.
2005), in Kenya (Robinson and Yeh 2011), in Congo (Ntumbanzondo et al. 2006), in
Chicago (Levitt and Venkatesh 2007) and, most recently, in Ecuador (Arunachalam and
Shah 2013). Throughout this literature, however, with the exception of Arunachalam
and Shah (2013), researchers have assumed that this premium reflects a compensating
differential for STI risk. This inference is made because the price for unprotected sex
increases with STI prevalence. Specifically, Arunachalam and Shah (2013) find that a
1 percentage increase in STI prevalence increases the price premium by 33 percentage
points. They also find that the anal sex premium is larger than the vaginal sex premium,
as do Robinson and Yeh (2011). STIs can be quite costly because as Oster (2005) shows,
non-HIV/AIDS STI transmission can be the key factor in HIV/AIDS transmission.
In this paper, I introduce a novel source of the price premium that has gone unex-
plored in the literature. I argue that another significant source of the price premium is
a compensating differential for pregnancy risk. I chart this course because the literature
has so far ignored the fact that condoms prevent both STIs and pregnancy. Therefore,
looking at the differential prices clients pay for unprotected sex will capture not only
sex workers’ compensating differential for STI risk but also pregnancy risk. Using a
rich dataset from Robinson and Yeh (2011), I test to see whether a compensating dif-
ferential for pregnancy risk is another source of the price premium for unprotected sex.
I also test the compensating differential for STI risk independently and controlling for
the possibility of pregnancy risk. For completeness, I also test whether clients’ disutility
for condoms explains the price premium for unprotected sex. I test for clients’ disutil-
ity for condoms because the literature also suggests that regardless of sex workers’ risk
aversion to STIs, a price premium for unprotected sex will still be observed because of
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sex workers’ ability to charge clients more because of their disutility for condom use
(Arunachalam and Shah 2013). Rao et al. (2003) argues that the price premium for
unprotected sex stems from clients’ unwillingness to use condoms. Gertler et al. (2005)
model the price premium as the result of clients’ willingness to pay for and sex workers’
willingness to accept unprotected sex, and find that attractive sex workers get about
twice the premium for unprotected sex, a measure of bargaining power. The unique
contribution of this paper to the literature is the introduction of pregnancy risk as a
source of the price premium; employment of innovative techniques to directly measure
pregnancy risk using probabilities of pregnancy; and of course the evaluation of all the
competing theories of the source of the price premium for unprotected sex.
In testing for the sources of the price premium for unprotected sex, I use robust
measures of STI risk, pregnancy risk, and clients’ disutility for condoms.1 To measure
STI risk, I interact two variables. The first is a dummy variable equal to one for each
sexual transaction that occurred without a condom. This first variable allows me to
identify the price premium for unprotected sex. The second is a dummy variable equal
to one for each sexual transaction that occurred with a client who the sex worker viewed
as being at high risk of having HIV/AIDS. This second variable allows me to identify how
much risky clients get charged by sex workers during sexual transactions. Together, the
interaction of these two variables reflect my measure of the price premium for unprotected
sex due to STI risk.
To measure pregnancy risk I interact three variables. The first is a dummy variable
equal to one for each sexual transaction that occurred without a condom. This first
variable allows me to identify the price premium for unprotected sex. The second is
a dummy variable equal to one for each sexual transaction that occurred with a sex
worker who is not on birth control. This second variable allows me to identify, for sex
workers who are not on birth control, how much they charge for sexual transactions.
1Further details of all these measures are in Section 3.2.
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The third is a variable equal to the direct probabilities of pregnancy for each sex worker.
This third variable reflects a direct measure of pregnancy risk and together, these three
variables allow me identify, for each unprotected sexual transaction, how much a sex
worker charged a client during days when her chances of getting pregnant were non-
negligibly above zero.
To measure clients’ disutility for condoms, I interact two variables. The first is
a dummy variable equal to one for each sexual transaction that occurred without a
condom. This first variable allows me to identify the price premium for unprotected sex.
The second is a dummy variable equal to one for each sexual transaction that occurred
with a client who has unprotected sex more or much more than the average client. This
second variable reflects clients’ disutility for condoms. Together, these two variables
allow me to identify for each unprotected sexual transaction, how much a client with a
disutility for condoms pay.
Using all these measures, I run sex worker-fixed effects regressions and find that
while a compensating differential for STI risk remains a source of the price premium
for unprotected sex, but I also find that a compensating differential for pregnancy risk
is another source of the price premium for unprotected sex. In fact, the relationship
between pregnancy risk and the price premium for unprotected sex is both statistically
and economically stronger than that with STI risk. The price premium for pregnancy risk
is USD 102, while the price premium for STI risk is USD 2 or 24 percent of average price,
but only a fifth of the compensating differential for pregnancy risk. Clients’ disutility for
condoms has a negative effect on price and is not statistically signficant and so I reject
clients’ disutility for condoms as a source of the price premium for unprotected sex.
Resolving arguments about the competing sources of the price premium will allow
policy makers and health practitioners to better target health interventions and miti-
2Robinson and Yeh (2011) report that the Kenyan shilling-US dollar exchange rate during sampling
was 70 Ksh to the dollar. I use this exchange rate to calculate dollar values throughout this paper to
get a sense of these premia in US dollars.
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gate the spread of HIV/AIDS. This is particularly important because sex workers have
HIV prevalence rates that are higher than other groups in the population and are thus
significant drivers of HIV/AIDS epidemics across many countries. Globally, sex workers
experience higher rates of HIV infection than in most other population groups (UNAIDS
2009).3 In places where STI risk is minimal then pregnancy risk becomes more salient.
This is important because a condom-promotion campaign for instance will have little
impact on reducing the incentives for sex workers to supply unprotected sex. A better
campaign would be to increase access to birth controls that will reduce sex workers’
pregnancy risk and thus reduce the price premium for unprotected sex, which in turn
reduces incentives to supply unprotected sex, both at the intensive margin (a sex worker
reducing the amount of unprotected sex) and the extensive margin (a sex worker exiting
the market for sex).
Section 2 provides motivation and a simple theory as to why compensating differen-
tials for STI risk and pregnancy risk are sources of the price premium for unprotected sex.
Section 3 presents the data. The remaining sections introduce the empirical specifica-
tions and presents results (Section 4), while the penultimate section presents robustness
checks and limitations of my analysis (Section 5), and the final section concludes the
paper (Section 6).
2 Motivation and Theory
2.1 STI Risk
Although having unprotected sex increases sex workers’ risk of STI infection and we
should observe them reducing risky sexual behavior (Posner 1992), the price premium
for unprotected sex acts to incentivize sex workers towards risky sexual behavior. In an
attempt to capture this premium, sex workers are incentivized to instead increase risky
sexual behavior. Sex workers also use the price premium to smooth consumption during
3See Figure in the Appendix that uses data from UNAIDS (2010) showing a linear relationship
between HIV prevalence among sex workers and the general population.
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idiosyncratic health shocks (Robinson and Yeh 2011). Arunachalam and Shah (2013)
provide the most compelling and rigorous evaluation of the compensating differential for
STI risk as a source of the price premium for unprotected sex. They introduce a simple
theoretical framework than incorporates clients’ disutility for condoms as well as sex
workers’ risk aversion to STI transmission. In this paper, I build on Arunachalam and
Shah (2013) by including STI risk in the theoretical framework along with pregnancy risk.
Before I introduce the simple model, I will motivate the discussion on why pregnancy
risk is also relevant for sex workers.
2.2 Pregnancy Risk
Although Arunachalam and Shah (2013) provide rigorous evidence as to why a com-
pensating differential for STI risk is a source of the price premium for unprotected sex,
they also find that the price premium for unprotected sex is observed in places with
zero STI prevalence. Since condoms exclude the possibility of STI infection as well as
pregnancy, the inference that unprotected sex is transacted at a relatively higher price
than protected sex as compensation for increased STI risk is far from robust. To resolve
this issue, any empirical test of the theory for the compensating differential for STI risk
must exclude the possibility of other costs which are also prevented through condom use
and which sex workers might potentially wish to avoid, such as pregnancy.
Pregnancy introduces several costs to the sex worker including (1) the direct costs of
child-rearing, which are non-negative and non-trivial4; (2) lost wages during the latter
stages of pregnancy and early stages of the child’s infancy when the mother’s time is
almost exclusively used caring for the infant and she is unable to work for wages; and (3)
if the sex worker decides to abort, costs of abortion including monetary costs and any
health complications that occur as a result of the procedure, both physiological as well
4Important inputs in the rearing of children include food and housing at the most basic level and
education at a much higher order level all of which are non-trivially above zero.
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as psychic costs.5 The profit maximizing sex worker would thus engage in unprotected
sex if and only if the price premium for unprotected sex is greater than the marginal
cost to unprotected sex, i.e. STI risk and pregnancy risk.
2.3 STI Risk and Pregnancy Risk
To fix ideas, I present a simple model that incorporates both STI risk and pregnancy
risk. I argue more formally and let P1 be the price received by a sex worker for unpro-
tected sex in the sex market or the price premium; P2 be the price received by a sex
worker for protected sex in the sex market; Q be sexual transactions by the sex worker
in the sex market; G and S be the probability of getting pregnant and contracting an
STI, respectively (where of course (0 ≤ G ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ S ≤ 1). Let Cg be all the costs of
pregnancy, including costs of rearing a child from pregnancy to maturity into adulthood
and independence or any abortion costs, while Cs be all the costs of STI transmission
such as direct health costs and lost wages during symptomatic periods. As such, if the
sex worker chooses to supply unprotected sex, her expected pay off would be;
P1Q−GCg − SCs (1)
On the other hand, if the CSW chooses to supply protected sex, her expected pay
5Besides these costs, an additional cost might be reduced marriage prospects. Siow (1998) and
Edlund and Korn (2002) assume that men prefer to marry women who have no children implying that
children might also potentially reduce marriage prospects. Becker (1993) argues that children are seen
as capital investment in marriage, and thus the prospect of divorce lowers the accumulation of children
and also shows that empirically, divorced women with children remarry more slowly than divorced men.
Weitzman and Dixon (1979) argue that young children raise the cost of searching for another mate and
reduce the net resources of these mothers. Although all these should push us to believe that sex work
lowers marriage prospects, sex workers in our dataset however, say that sex work has increased their
marriage prospects. Although Robinson and Yeh (2011) suggest that sex work might affect marriage
prospects on the intensive (partner quality) rather than the extensive (finding a partner) margin, I
exclude this possible cost of marriage prospects so to not detract from the general point that pregnancy
and its products are costly to sex workers.
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off would be;
P2Q−GCg − SCs (2)
where in this case G and S are both zero6 and so that her expected pay off to
supplying protected sex reduces to;
P2Q (3)
Her decision rule is thus very simply to supply unprotected sex if and only if (1) is
greater than (2), but to simplify, I let Q equal to 1, so that the sex worker is making
this decision each time she engages in transactional sex or;
P1 −GCg − SCs > P2 (4)
and I can thus bring GCg and SCs to the other side, we get;
P1 > P2 +GCg + SCs (5)
This implies that the profit maximizing sex worker will supply unprotected sex in
the sex market if and only if the price received for unprotected sex exceeds the price
received for protected sex in the sex market and/or exceeds the sum of the probabilities
of getting pregnant and getting STIs, the costs of pregnancy and STI transmission.
In their modeling, Arunachalam and Shah (2013) propose that it is not possible to
6Many studies have showed that condoms are highly effective at preventing, not only STI transmis-
sion, but also pregnancy. Davis and Weller (1999) for instance document condom efficacy in relation
to HIV transmission and pregnancy. They find that the likelihood of pregnancy after protected sexual
intercourse is as low as 0.026 and a condom’s effectiveness at preventing HIV transmission is estimated
to be as high as 96 percent. This simplifying assumption allows me to focus on just the effects of STI
risk and pregnancy risk whenever a condom is not used, but is not an impossible scenario.
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unambiguously sign P1−P2 whenever STI risk equals zero. In essence, they are not able
to distinguish between GCg + SCs > 0 and SCs > 0. I show that their assumption that
if SCs = 0 then one cannot sign the price differential between unprotected and protected
sex is incomplete. Notice that their argument is that when P1 > P2 +GCg + SCs, as in
my framework, and we rearrange to make P1 − P2 > GCg + SCs and let SCs = 0, then
it is impossible to sign P1 − P2 but in my framework this price differential is greater
than GCg and if we take the existence of the price premium as given, then GCg > 0.
This means that since G 6= 0 (lower bound for any probability is zero) then Cg 6= 0
and in fact must be greater than zero because there cannot be returns to pregnancy, at
least not immediately, that will factor into a sex worker’s decision to have protected or
unprotected sex. Notice also then that if GCg > 0 and Cg > 0 then G > 0.
Given all of this then I can formally propose the following.
2.4 Proposition
If SCs = 0 and P1 − P2 > 0 then GCg > 0.7 In other words, if STI risk is zero and
there exists a price premium for unprotected sex, then it must be that a compensating
differential for pregnancy risk is the source of the price premium for unprotected sex.
2.5 Implications
Given that condoms prevent both STIs and pregnancy, if we observe sex being trans-
acted at a higher price when no condom is used and STI prevalence is zero, then it
must be that the compensating differential for pregnancy risk is a source of the price
premium for unprotected sex. The major insight in this paper is that what Arunachalam
and Shah (2013) really observe is P1 − P2 > GCg + SCs > 0 but they assume they are
observing P1 − P2 > SCs > 0, failing to distinguish the two structural equations. I will
show in this paper that the observed price premium for unprotected sex sits within the
7All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
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first structural equation rather than the second. Sections 3 and 4 introduce the data
and the empirical specifications.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
3.1 Data
The dataset is from Robinson and Yeh (2011)8 and includes background information
and self-reported information by 192 sex workers reporting on 19,041 sexual transactions
in 12,536 sex worker days. A random sample of 248 women were selected to be a part
of the study from 1,205 women identified. Of these 248 women, only 192 women had
complete and usable data. Of these 56 that did not constitute the final sample, 7
refused to participate at all, and the remaining 49 either did not complete the study
or had unusable reported data. Robinson and Yeh (2011) report that these 49 attrited
women are not statistically different along most background characteristics as those who
remained in the study. Data collection occurred between October 2005 and October 2006.
A baseline survey collected background information on the women, and all women were
asked to keep and record sexual transactions through provided diaries. The women were
compensated with paid cash for keeping these diaries. The women were asked to provide
detailed information about the sexual transactions with clients (up to a maximum of
three transactions per day). To avoid losing illiterate women in the sample, efforts were
made to help these women fill in the diaries, however literacy in the sample was relatively
high with 95 percent and 88 percent of sampled women being able to read and write
Kiswahili, respectively.9
8More details on this dataset can be found on pages 39-43 from Robinson and Yeh (2011).
9See Table 7.1.
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3.2 Measuring Pregnancy Risk, STI Risk, and Clients’ Disutility for
Condoms
In order to measure pregnancy risk, STI risk, and clients’ disutility for condoms, I
interacted several variables from the Robinson and Yeh (2011) dataset.
3.2.1 STI Risk
To measure STI risk, I interact two variables. The first is a dummy variable equal
to one for each sexual transaction that occurred without a condom. This first variable
allows me to identify the price premium for unprotected sex. The second is a dummy
variable equal to one for each sexual transaction that occurred with a client who the sex
worker viewed as being at high risk of having HIV/AIDS. This second variable allows me
to identify how much risky clients get charged by sex workers during sexual transactions.
Together, the interaction of these two variables reflect my measure of the price premium
for unprotected sex due to STI risk.
3.2.2 Pregnancy Risk
To measure pregnancy risk I interact three variables. The first is a dummy variable
equal to one for each sexual transaction that occurred without a condom. This first
variable allows me to identify the price premium for unprotected sex. The second is
a dummy variable equal to one for each sexual transaction that occurred with a sex
worker who is not on birth control. This second variable allows me to identify, for sex
workers who are not on birth control, how much they charge for sexual transactions.
The third is a variable equal to the direct probabilities of pregnancy for each sex worker.
I use estimated probabilities of pregnancy from Wilcox et al. (2001) and Wilcox et al.
(1995). Wilcox et al. (2001) calculate estimated mean probabilities of clinical pregnancy
for each day of a woman’s menstrual cycle10 while Wilcox et al. (1995, p. 1519) provide
10Table 1 on page 213 of Wilcox et al. (2001) presents these estimates.
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probabilities of pregnancy for a woman who has unprotected sexual intercourse everyday
(0.37), every other day (0.33), and once per week (0.15).
Before assigning probabilities of pregnancy, however, I first must have information
on the exact day a sex worker is in her menstrual cycle. Ideally, the Robinson and Yeh
(2011) dataset would have collected information on this by either asking the women
exactly what day they are in their menstrual cycle or by asking a simpler question on
how many days have passed since the last day of their menstruation. This information
would allow me to know exactly, for each sexual transaction, the day of the menstrual
cycle a particular sex worker is in. However, the Robinson and Yeh (2011) dataset
does not have information that allows me to know what day a particular sex worker
is in her menstrual cycle. It does, on the other hand, have information on, for each
sexual transaction, whether the sex worker was menstruating the day before or currently
menstruating for the day of the recorded sexual transactions. These two variables allow
me to know with certainty, for each sexual transaction, when a sex worker is on the first
to fifth day of her menstrual cycle.
Figure 1: Menstrual Cycle of the Average Woman.
Source: http : //www.cyclebeads.com
Specifically, if the sex worker reports not having menstruated the day before, and
menstruating the day of the recorded sexual transactions, then she is on the first day
of her “menses”. If the sex worker reports having menstruated the day before, but not
menstruating the day of the recorded sexual transactions, then she is on the fifth day of
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her menstrual cycle. If the sex worker reports menstruating the day before and the day
of the recorded sexual transactions, then she is either on the second, third, or fourth
day of her menstrual cycle. The data does not allow me to distinguish exactly which
of these days is possible, so in assigning probabilities of pregnancy for these days, I
average estimated probabilities for each of these days and assign this average whenever
a sex worker reports menstruating the day before and the day of the recorded sexual
transactions.
Even more uncertain is when a sex worker reports not menstruating the day before
and not menstruating the day of the recorded sexual transactions. The sex worker could
be in any one of the remaining twenty-seven days between the sixth and the thirty-second
day of her menstrual cycle.11 To try and reduce this problem, I estimate the probability
that the sex worker is on the days within her fertile window period. A woman’s fertile
window12 is during the twelve days between the eighth and the nineteenth day, inclusive,
of her menstrual cycle. Given that the data allows me to know when a sex worker is
on the days between the first and the fifth day, inclusive, of her menstrual cycle, I
subtract these first five days from the total days of her menstrual cycle to find the total
number of possible days that a sex worker might be on if she reports not menstruating
the day before and not menstruating the day of the recorded sexual transactions. This
subtraction deduces to a total of twenty-seven possible days (thirty-two minus five)
that a sex worker might be on if she reports not menstruating the day before and not
menstruating the day of the recorded sexual transactions. So the probability that a sex
worker is on days that are within her fertile window period is twelve over twenty-seven
or 0.4444444.
11Although a typical menstrual cycle lasts between twenty-six and thirty-two days, I assume sex
workers in the sample have thirty-two day-menstrual cycles so that my pregnancy probabilities constitute
lower bound and thus conservative estimates of a sex worker’s chances of getting pregnant. This allows
for any identification of pregnancy risk’s effect on the price for unprotected sex to be as conservative as
possible.
12Please note that this fertile window period incorporates a woman’s ovulation cycle and sperm life
within a woman’s body and that around 80 percent of women fall within this fertile window because
they typically have 26-32 day menstrual cycles (University 2013).
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After estimating the exact menstrual day for each sex worker during each day of
recorded sexual transactions, I assign probabilities for exact days of the menstrual cycle,
and multiply probabilities of pregnancy with probability of the sex worker being in a
particular menstrual day including most importantly, days that fall within her fertile
window period. For days that fall within a sex worker’s fertile window period, I use
Wilcox et al. (1995)’s probability of clinical pregnancy for a woman who has unpro-
tected sexual intercourse every other day, which is 0.33.13 I multiply this probability
with 0.4444444, which is the probability that a sex worker is on a day within her fer-
tile window period and get 0.14666666666, which I assign to a sex worker who reports
not menstruating the day before and not menstruating the day of the recorded sexual
transactions.14
In summary, this third variable is equal to zero if a sex worker is on the first day of her
menstrual cycle and equal to 0.00415 if a sex worker is on the fifth day of her menstrual
cycle. Recall that because I do not know with absolute certainty whether a sex worker is
on the second, third, or fourth day of her menstrual cycle, I average the probabilitites for
each of these days from the Wilcox et al. (2001) data. Those estimates are probabilities
of pregnancy of zero for the second day; 0.001 for the third day; and 0.002 for the fourth
13I use this probability because about 81 percent of sex workers in the sample had sexual intercourse
each day and so this is a lower bound estimate of the chances of these women getting pregnant given
their relatively high sexual activities. More importantly, although frequent sexual intercourse affects the
potency of sperm (MacLeod and Gold 1953; Freund 1962; Poland et al. 1985), these sexual transactions
did not necessarily occur with the same clients. In fact, only 17 percent of transactions, on average,
in the dataset occurred with regular clients, while on the other hand, over 64 percent of transactions,
on average, occurred with casual clients. It is also important to note that Dunson et al. (1999), in
re-evaluating Wilcox et al. (1995)’s estimates, revises those estimates to as high as 0.42. Both these
points are important to keep in mind because the probability of pregnancy I use here for these women
(sex workers) constitutes a conservative estimate of their actual probabilities of pregnancy.
14Although the probability of pregnancy is dependent on the menstrual day that a woman is on,
this particular probability covers the probability of pregnancy for a woman who has sexual intercourse
every other day, regardless of her menstrual days, and thus independent. This allows me to multiply
the two probabilities as per simple probability theory. Moreover, using the probability of pregnancy
for a woman who has sexual intercourse everyday (0.37) would have been even more appropriate, but
this would have provided an upper bound estimate and for the purposes of this paper, might provide
overestimated effects of pregnancy risk on the price for unprotected sex.
15Table 1 on page 213 of Wilcox et al. (2001) presents these day-specific probability of pregnancy
estimates.
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day of a sex worker’s menstrual cycle.16 The average of these three estimates is thus
0.001, which is what I use whenever a sex worker reports having menstruated the day
before and menstruating the day of the recorded sexual transactions. Finally, this third
variable is equal to 0.14666666666 for sex workers that report not having menstruated
the day before or the day of the recorded transactions.17 In other words, for sex workers
that are not in the first, second, third, fourth or fifth days of their menstrual cycles.
3.2.3 Clients’ Disutility for Condoms
To measure clients’ disutility for condoms, I interact two variables. The first is
a dummy variable equal to one for each sexual transaction that occurred without a
condom. This first variable allows me to identify the price premium for unprotected sex.
The second is a dummy variable equal to one for each sexual transaction that occurred
with a client who has unprotected sex more or much more than the average client. This
second variable reflects clients’ disutility for condoms. Together, these two variables
allow me to identify for each unprotected sexual transaction, how much a client with a
disutility for condoms pay.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are presented in Tables 1-3 in the Appendix. The average sex
worker in the sample is 28 years old, started sex work when she was around 19 years
old, has 2 children, and has completed over nine grade years of education.18 Forty-four
percent of sex workers in the sample have never been married, while twenty-three and
twenty percent of sex workers in the sample have been widowed or divorced, respectively.
16Ibid.
17Notice here that by collapsing the twenty-seven days between days 7 and 32, inclusive, I lose a lot of
pregnancy risk variation. So my pregnancy risk measure is imprecise and quite conservative. Any effect I
find is thus convincing evidence of a compensating differential for pregnancy risk, given the conservative
and noisy measure of pregnancy risk.
18The education level of the sex workers in the sample is similar to that of the average Kenyan woman
(Robinson and Yeh 2011).
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Ninety percent of the sampled women come from the Luo and Luhya tribes.
Table 7.1 here.
The women in the sample are well informed about the risks related to HIV/AIDS,
as demonstrated by the fact that the average woman in the sample scored 94 out of 100
on a test of HIV knowledge. The test evaluated knowledge on HIV transmission, risk
reduction methods, and misconceptions surrounding HIV/AIDS. Women in the sample
earn more money from sex work than from other activities. The average woman in the
sample earns 851 Ksh (USD 12) a day from over 7 hours of sex work, for an hourly wage
rate of about 152 Ksh (USD 2). Alternatively, the average woman earns just 106 Ksh
(USD 1.5) per day from other work over an 8 hour day, for a daily wage rate of about
41 Ksh (USD 0.6). Sex workers in this sample are similar to other sex worker samples
from other studies in this regard because the average sex worker typically earns more
than a similar woman with similar demographics in the general population (Edlund and
Korn 2002; Gertler et al. 2005; Arunachalam and Shah 2013).
Table 7.2 here.
The data also provides very detailed information on all the 3,656 clients. Nine per-
cent of clients are considered poor19 and about twenty-seven percent are government
employees. Nineteen percent work as truck drivers and another nineteen percent busi-
nessmen. Forty-nine percent are from the Luhya and Luo tribes. Fourteen percent are
from the Kikuyu tribe, while six percent and four percent are Somalis and Ugandans,
respectively. Sixty-two percent and fifty-four percent of clients are considered clean and
handsome, respectively. A quarter of clients are uncircumcised, and forty-six percent are
considered at high risk of HIV/AIDS. Forty-five percent of clients have some disutility
for condoms.
19Details on what constitutes poor can be found in Robinson and Yeh (2011).
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Figure 2: Price Premium for Unprotected Sex.
Eight percent of sex workers reported having vaginal sex without a condom. Three
percent of sex workers report having some STI and an equal percentage report having
unprotected vaginal sex with a client at high risk of HIV/AIDS. Sixty percent of sex
workers are on birth control and nine percent and eight percent of sex workers were
menstruating yesterday and today, respectively. The average woman received 510 Ksh
(USD 7.3) for each sexual transaction. Figure 3.3 shows that the average price for each
unprotected vaginal sexual transaction is 604 Ksh (USD 8.6), while each vaginal sexual
transaction with a condom is 550 Ksh (USD 7.9), providing suggestive evidence that
there is a price premium for unprotected sex consistent with the literature.
Table 7.3 here.
17
4 Empirical Specifications and Results
4.1 Specification
To test the competing theories of sources of the price premium, I estimate four main
fixed effects regression models. Sex worker- and client-specific controls are included in
the complete specifications, with day and month dummies.20 The first three models
regress the price for transactional sex in Kenyan shillings separately on STI risk (1),
pregnancy risk (2), and clients’ disutility for condoms (3). The equations are as follows;
Pirt =β0 + β1NC + β2RL+ β3(NC ×RL) +
S∑
s=1
βsγsirt +
C∑
c=1
βcωcirt+
αi + τt + irt
(1)
Pirt =β0 + β1NC + β2PP + β3(PP ×NB) + β4(NC × PP ×NB)+
S∑
s=1
βsγsirt +
C∑
c=1
βcωcirt + αi + τt + irt
(2)
Pirt =β0 + β1NC + β2DC + β3(DC ×NC) +
S∑
s=1
βsγsirt +
C∑
c=1
βcωcirt+
αi + τt + irt
(3)
where NC or No Condom is a dummy variable equal to one when a condom is not
used during vaginal sex; RL or Risky Client is a dummy variable equal to one when
the sexual transaction occurred with a client whom the sex worker reported as being at
20I control for sex workers’ age, experience, years of education, literacy, tribe, marital status, and
number of children. I also control for whether clients are regular, clean, wealthy, handsome, and for their
ethnicity. Finally, I include day and month dummies in all specifications.
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high risk of HIV/AIDS; and of course NC × RL is the interaction between the two, and
constitutes my main measure of STI risk.
PP or Probability of Pregnancy is the direct measure of clinical pregnancy for each
sexual transaction; NB or No Birth Control is a dummy variable equal to one when
the sexual transaction occurred with a sex worker who is not on birth control; PP ×
NB is the interaction between the Probability of Pregnancy and No Birth Control ; and
of course NC × PP × NB is the interaction between No Condom, the Probability of
Pregnancy, and No Birth Control.
Finally, DC or Clients’ Disutility for Condoms is a dummy variable equal to one when
a sexual transaction occurred with a client who has more or much more unprotected sex
than the average client.21 Of course, DC × NC is the interaction between Clients’
Disutility for Condoms and No Condom.
In the specifications above, r indexes transactions, for the ith sex worker at the tth
date. Please note that γsirt and ωirt are sex worker- and client-controls, respectively, while
αi and τt represent the sex worker and time fixed effects, respectively. The sex worker
fixed effect αi will account for differences across sex workers in attractiveness (bargaining
power), fertility, and risk preferences, while τt will pick up other time-varying effects,
such as day-specific demand changes.22 Finally, irt is an idiosyncratic error term. In all
specifications standard errors are clustered at the sex worker level.23
The first specification (1) tests for STI risk. The coefficient β3 from specification (1)
represents the price of a sexual transaction that occurred without a condom and with a
risky client; β2 represents the price for protected sex with a client who is not risky, while
21This dummy variable incorporates two dummy variables from the Robinson and Yeh (2011) data.
Those two variables are a dummy variable equal to one when a sex worker reports having sex with a
client who has more unprotected sex than average client; and a dummy variable when a sex worker
reports having sex with a client who has much more unprotected sex than average client.
22This fixed effects specification is consistent with the literature. Robinson and Yeh (2011) includes
a sex worker fixed effect as well as time dummies, while Arunachalam and Shah (2013) include just a
sex worker fixed effect.
23Running all the models by clustering standard errors at the sex worker level, to account for the fact
that errors are likely correlated for a particular sex worker is consistent with Robinson and Yeh (2011),
while Arunachalam and Shah (2013) cluster at the sex worker city location level.
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β1 captures the price paid for unprotected sex with a client who is not risky. Results for
this specification are presented in Table 7.4.
The second specification (2) tests for pregnancy risk. The coefficient β4 from specifi-
cation (2) represents the price of a sexual transaction that occurred without a condom,
with a sex worker who is not on birth control, and interacted with the probability of
pregnancy; β3 represents the price for protected sex with a sex worker who is on birth
control, interacted with the probability of pregnancy; β2 represents the price dependent
on the probability of pregnancy, when a condom is used with a sex worker who is on
birth control, while β1 captures the price paid for unprotected sex when there is no
pregnancy risk. Results for this specification are presented in Table 7.5.
Finally, the third specification (3) tests for clients’ disutility for condoms. The coeffi-
cient β3 from specification (3) represents the price of a sexual transaction that occurred
without a condom and with a client who has a disutility for condoms; β2 represents the
price for protected sex with a client who has a disutility for condoms, while β1 cap-
tures the price paid for unprotected sex with a client who does not have a disutility for
condoms. Results for this specification are presented in Table 7.6.
If these regression models are properly specified and a relationship between STI risk;
pregnancy risk; clients’ disutility for condoms; and the price premium for unprotected
sex is identified, then β3 will reflect a compensating differential for STI risk and client’s
disutility for condoms for specifications (1) and (3), respectively, while β4 will reflect a
compensating differential for pregnancy risk for specification (2).
Finally, in a fourth specification (4) I include STI risk and pregnancy risk.24
24I drop clients’ disutility for condoms, because as results will show, clients’ disutility for condoms do
not drive the price premium for unprotected sex.
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Pirt =β0 + β1NC + β2RL+ β3(NC ×RL) + β4PP + β5(PP ×NB)+
β6(NC × PP ×NB) +
S∑
s=1
βsγsirt +
C∑
c=1
βcωcirt + αi + τt + irt
(4)
Once again if this regression is properly specified and a relationship between STI
risk and pregnancy risk and the price premium for unprotected sex is identified, then β3
will reflect a compensating differential for STI risk and β6 will reflect a compensating
differential for pregnancy risk.
To summarize, the first three models (specifications (1-3)) separately estimate the
effects that STI risk, pregnancy risk, and clients’ disutility for condoms have on the
price for transactional sex, while the fourth model (specification (4)) includes both STI
risk and pregnancy risk. This last model evaluates the competing sources against each
other and provides robust estimates as to which effect is largest as a source of the price
premium for unprotected sex. The second specification (2) answers the proposition from
Section 2.4.
4.2 Results
Main results from all the specifications are presented in Tables (7.4-7.7). Table 7.4
presents results for the STI risk specification (1). Columns 1-2 include just STI risk,
with column 1 run without sex worker and client controls; and column 2 run with all
the controls. Columns 3-4 include the full specification, once again with column 3 run
without sex worker and client controls; and column 4 run with all the controls.
Figure 4.2, although from raw data, motivates results from Table 7.4. The figure
clearly shows that average price for unprotected sex is higher with a risky client than
with a non-risky client. In fact, unprotected sex with a risky client is transacted at
around 691 Ksh (USD 9.9), while protected sex with a risky client and/or unprotected
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sex with a non-risky client is transacted at around 585 Ksh (USD 8.4).
Figure 3: Compesanting Differential for STI Risk.
Specifically, results from Table 7.4 show that a sex worker is compensated 143 Ksh
or USD 2 (column 2) for the risk of getting an STI. This coefficient is statistically
significant at 5 percent. When I control for risky clients; unprotected sex; sex worker and
client characteristics; as well as include time dummies this coefficient remains basically
unchanged (column 4) at 143 Ksh (USD 2), but standard errors increase slightly. This
coefficient, nevertheless, is still statistically significant at 10 percent.
Figure 4.2, although from raw data, motivates results from Table 7.5. The figure
clearly shows that average price for unprotected sex increases with the probability of
pregnancy.
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Figure 4: Compesanting Differential for Pregnancy Risk.
Specifically, on the 1st day of the menstrual cycle, when the probability of pregnancy
is zero, average price is about 553 Ksh (USD 7.9); 700 Ksh (USD 10) on the 2nd, 3rd,
or 4th days of the menstrual cycle, when the probability of pregnancy is 0.001; 950 Ksh
(USD 13.6) on the 5th day of the menstrual cycle, when the probability of pregnancy
is 0.004. Although the average price drops to 595 Ksh (USD 8.5) for days 6 to 32, note
two things:
1. Recall that these average prices are calculated over twenty-seven days in the men-
strual cycle collapsing a lot of variation in the probability of pregnancy.
2. The average price for these collapsed probabilities of pregnancy for days 6 to 32 is
still higher than the average price for the 1st day of the menstrual cycle. Ideally,
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having exact information of a sex worker’s menstrual cycle for each sexual trans-
action would have allowed me to more precisely identify pregnancy risk’s effect on
the price premium for unprotected sex.
Nevertheless, results will show that even with this noisy and imprecise measure of
pregnancy risk, it still suffices to identify a compensating differential for pregnancy risk.
Table 7.4 here.
Table 7.5 presents results for the pregnancy risk specification (2). Columns 1-2
include just pregnancy risk, with column 1 run without sex worker and client controls;
and column 2 run with all the controls. Columns 3-4 include the full specification, once
again with column 3 run without sex worker and client controls; and column 4 run with
all the controls. Results show that a sex worker is compensated as much as 716 Ksh
(USD 10) for the risk of getting pregnant. Notice that this is five times the compensating
differential for STI risk and the pregnancy risk coefficient, from column 4 of Table 7.5, is
more statistically significant (5 percent versus 10 percent) than the STI risk coefficient
from column 4 of Table 7.4.
Table 7.5 here.
Table 7.6 presents results for the clients’ disutility for condoms specification (3).
Columns 1-2 include just clients’ disutility for condoms, with column 1 run without
sex worker and client controls; and column 2 run with all the controls. Columns 3-4
include the full specification, once again with column 3 run without sex worker and
client controls; and column 4 run with all the controls. Column 1 shows that the price
premium for clients’ disutility for condoms is about 30 Ksh (0.43 USD), but the coefficient
is not statistically significant at 10 percent. Moreover, in columns 2-4, the coefficient
remains statistically insignificant and becomes negative. In the full specification (column
4) the coefficient can be interpreted as the price transacted without a condom and with
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a client who has a disutility for condoms occurs at roughly 70 Ksh (USD 1) less than
otherwise.
Table 7.4 here.
Finally, Table 7.7 presents results for the fourth specification (4). Columns 1-2
include just STI risk and pregnancy risk, with column 1 run without sex worker and
client controls; and column 2 run with all the controls. Columns 3-4 include the full
specification, once again with column 3 run without sex worker and client controls; and
column 4 run with all the controls. Specifically, columns 3-4 also control for unprotected
sex; risky client; probability of pregnancy; and pregnancy risk when a condom is used.
Table 7.7 here.
Column 1 shows that 76 Ksh (USD 1) and 594 (USD 8.5) are compensating dif-
ferentials for STI risk and pregnancy risk, respectively. However, these coefficients are
not statistically significant at 10 percent. Column 3, that includes the full specification
except sex worker and client controls, shows that a compensating differential for STI
risk increases to 102 Ksh (USD 1.5), while a compensating differential for pregnancy
risk also increases to 802 Ksh (USD 11.5). However, the former coefficient (STI Risk)
is not statistically significant at 10 percent, while the latter coefficient is statistically
significant significant at 10 percent. When I include sex worker and client controls, the
coefficient on STI risk becomes 92 Ksh (USD 1.3) and highly statistically insignificant
at 10 percent. Alternatively, the coefficient on pregnancy risk jumps to 861 Ksh (USD
12.3), but so too do the standard errors, making the p-value jump to 13 percent, and
thus only just statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level.
Although this result is null, I discuss in Section 5, not only why I find this result,
but why it does not reject a compensating differential for pregnancy risk. I do reject,
however, clients’ disutility for condoms as a source of the price premium for unprotected
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sex. Although specifications (1-2) show that a compensating differential for STI risk
remains, a compensating differential for pregnancy risk is not only larger, but also more
statistically significant. In section 5 that follows, I explore possible threats to internal
validity, provide several robustness checks, and discuss limitations of the paper.
5 Robustness and Limitations
I have presented evidence of compensating differentials for STI risk and pregnancy
risk as sources of the price premium for unprotected sex. To explore possible threats, I
separately present robustness checks for each of these sources.
5.1 STI Risk
To have confidence in the specifications that include STI risk, I must prove that the
variable STI risk is not endogenous to sex workers’ decisions that might be correlated
with other relevant characteristics. For instance, it might be that sex workers’ valuation
of clients’ risk is correlated with some client-specific effect such as wealth. Perhaps
clients with high STI risk are more likely to be wealthy, and, since wealthier clients
are more able to pay for transactional sex, an estimate of STI risk’s effect on the price
premium for unprotected sex would result in a positive relationship, however spurious
this relationship might be.
To control for such possibilities, I control for clients’ wealth, cleanliness, looks, and
ethnicity. Results presented in Table 7.4 are robust to these controls. I also control for
any sex worker-specific characteristics that do not change over time by running the sex
worker fixed effects. I also control for sex workers’ age, experience, years of education,
literacy, tribe, marital status, and number of children. I also include day and month
dummies to account for any demand effects that are day- or month-specific. Once again,
results presented in Table 7.4 are robust to these controls. To capture the possibility
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that errors are likely correlated for a particular woman, I cluster standard errors at the
sex worker level. All results report these sex worker-clustered standard errors.
Finally, I also run an instrumental variable estimation that uses the uncircumcised
clients as an instrument for STI risk. This estimation allows me to test for endogeneity
of my STI risk variable, thus providing greater confidence that the relationship between
STI risk and the price premium for unprotected sex is identified. I exploit the fact
that a sexual transaction with an uncircumcised men is external to the sex worker’s
choice.25 I also exploit the fact that uncircumcised men are more likely to get infected
with HIV/AIDS, among other STIs26, in order to remove any endogenous variation in
the STI risk variable by using uncircumcised clients as an instrument for STI risk. One
might worry that the exclusion restriction might not hold because who is and is not
circumcised might be related to ethnicity and other factors that could be related to
prices paid. For one, I run a a simple linear regression expressing client characteristics
as statistically significant predictors of circumcision and find that indeed being a Luo;
Teso; and have handsome looks positively predicts circumcision status. But when I run
these predictors in a linear regression with price, almost all become negative and not
statistically significant at 10 percent.27 So although I find that some client characteristics
are linked to circumcision status, these characteristics do not predict price.
Table 7.8 here.
Table 7.8 presents results from the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation using
uncircumcised clients as an instrument for STI risk. The coefficient on STI risk is 246
Ksh (USD 3.5), but not statistically significant at 10 percent. After the IV estimateion, I
25Sex workers can decline a sexual transaction with an uncircumcised client, or avoid clients they
know to be uncircumcised from previous sexual encounters but for an overwhelming majority of sex
workers, the choice of having sex with an uncircumcised client is largely outside their control.
26Many studies show that uncircumcised men are relatively more likely to get infected with HIV/AIDS,
genital herpes, syphilis, chancroid and other STIs. For further reading on this see for instance Bailey
et al. (2007); Gray et al. (2007); Weiss et al. (2006); Auvert et al. (2005); Weiss et al. (2000); and
Bongaarts et al. (1989).
27Results of these available upon request.
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conduct the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity to test for the endogeneity of my
STI risk measure. Results from the test, presented in Table 7.9, show that at 10 percent
level of significance, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that STI risk is exogenous.
Table 7.9 here.
5.2 Pregnancy Risk
Underlying my introduction of pregnancy risk as a novel source of the price premium
for unprotected sex is that condoms prevent both STI and pregnancy. To convincingly
show that a compensating differential for pregnancy risk is identified, it must find a
channel that increases the chances of pregnancy, while not affecting the chances of STI
transmission. Birth control certainly allows me to observe marginal increases in preg-
nancy risk while not affecting the probabilitiy of STI transmission. Even more robustly,
what I would like is to run my main pregnancy risk specification, control for unprotected
sex, risky clients, STI risk, and all other sex worker, client, and time controls, including
of course the sex worker fixed effects specification, clustering standard errors at the sex
worker level. I would then predict prices conditional on all of these observables; plot
these predicted prices along my probability of pregnancy dimension, for sex workers with
birth control and those without birth control. Ideally, I would observe predicted prices
conditional on all the aforementioned, for sex workers without birth control, be higher
than predicted prices for sex workers with birth control. Figure 5.2 presents results from
just that.
The bars are average predicted prices from a sex worker fixed effects regression that
includes controlling for all sex worker controls; client controls; time dummies; unpro-
tected sex; and STI risk. Specifically, the red bars are average predicted prices only for
sex workers without birth control, and thus non-negligible probabilities of pregnancy,
depending on their menstrual cycle, while the blue bars are average predicted prices
only for sex workers with birth control. This figure illustrates a robust price differential
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between prices received by sex workers without birth control relative to sex workers with
birth control.
Figure 5: Conditional Predicted Price by Birth Control Across Menstrual Cycle.
I go even further, however, by running a placebo test on birth control. I run a sex
worker fixed effects regression that includes all sex worker controls; client controls; time
dummies; as well as unprotected sex. Most importantly, I include the interaction (No
Condom × Probability of Pregnancy) which captures the chances of a sex worker getting
pregnant. Once again, I cluster standard errors at the sex worker level and run this
regression only for sex workers who are on birth control. If there exists no compensating
differential for pregnancy risk, then the coefficient on this main pregnancy risk variable
will not have any predictive power on price because we should not expect sex workers
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who are on birth control to worry about pregnancy risk. Table 7.10 presents the results
from this estimation.
Table 7.10 here.
Although the coefficient of 1,727.8 Ksh (USD 24.7) is sufficiently large, it is however
not statistically significant at 10 percent. In short, this is further evidence that a com-
pensating differential for pregnancy risk is a source of the price premium for unprotected
sex. But to be even more robust, I also run my main pregnancy risk specification an in-
strumental variable approach using the direct probability of pregnancy as an instrument
for pregnancy risk.
Table 7.11 here.
Table 7.11 presents results from this IV approach. Results show that there is still a
price premium for pregnancy risk; however, this is not statistically significant at the 10
percent level. Using this same IV approach, however, we are able to test whether our
main measure of pregnancy risk is endogenous. Table 7.12 presents results from testing
the endogeneity of the pregnancy risk variable. Results from the test show that, at the
10 percent level of significance, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that pregnancy risk
is exogenous.
Table 7.12 here.
Finally, another important identifying assumption is that the menstrual cycle, which
reflects an exogenous measure of pregnancy risk, explains the price premium for preg-
nancy risk. To be true, an underlying assumption is that sex workers also understand
and are aware of this pregnancy risk, i.e. they have knowledge about the Standard Days
Method or other fertility awareness-based methods (University 2013).28 The confidence
28These methods involve the woman being aware and keeping track of her menstrual cycle in order
to avoid having unprotected sex during her peak fertile days.
30
that sex workers are aware of their respective chances of getting pregnant stem from two
sources. First, recall that sex workers in the dataset have high HIV/AIDS knowledge.
Table 7.3 presents that the average test score on HIV/AIDS knowledge (in a scale of 0-1)
is 0.94. Second, and even more robust, I run a linear regression using this HIV/AIDS
knowledge test score as a predictor of whether a sex worker uses birth control. The as-
sumption here is that HIV/AIDS knowledge is strongly correlated with pregnancy risk
knowledge. Table 7.13 presents results from this regression. Although the coefficient is
not statistically significant at 10 percent, sex workers with higher HIV/AIDS knowledge
are more likely to use birth control, providing suggestive evidence that sex workers are
not uninformed about pregnancy risks.
Table 7.13 here.
Having said that, the single-most limitation of this paper is the availability of data
that would allow us to better estimate the compensating differential for pregnancy risk.
Better data on the specific sex worker-menstrual day mapping would allow us to find
more precise estimates. However, this paper, given data constraints, constitutes not only
the most rigorous attempt at exploring pregnancy risk as a source of the price premium
for unprotected sex, but goes further by identifying it.
6 Conclusion
Using a rich dataset from Robinson and Yeh (2011) containing information on risky
clients, clients’ preferences for condom use, and pregnancy relevant variables, I identify
and estimate the sources of the price premium for unprotected sex. I find that a com-
pensating differential for STI risk and pregnancy risk are sources of the price premium
for unprotected sex. Sex workers are risk averse to both STI and pregnancy because of
the non-trivial costs of taking care of children for the latter and the costs of mitigating
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STI transmission for the former. I find that clients’ disutility for condoms, the other
competing theory, is not a source of the price premium for unprotected sex.
Identifying and estimating the sources of the price premium is important because
the ultimate goal of public policy should be to reduce incentives of sex workers to supply
unprotected sex and clients to demand unprotected sex. Because sex workers contribute
to the transmission of HIV/AIDS and it requires billions of dollars to take care for
vulnerable children such as HIV/AIDS orphans (Stover et al. 2007), understanding sex
workers’ fertility preferences and reducing their incentives to have unprotected sex will
save resource-constraints governments in the developing world money that can be better
targeted to intervene with sex workers and clients. Knowledge about the source of the
price premium for unprotected sex is informative and prescriptive when determining how
public health interventions should be targeted. Future work could possibly explore these
potential avenues as well as look at whether sex workers respond to economic incentives
to engage in safe sex.
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7 Tables
7.1 Table 1: Sex Worker Information
Summary Statistics
Age 28.43
(6.98)
Start Age 18.67
(5.14)
Experience 9.84
(6.07)
Years of Education 9.20
(2.69)
Number of Biological Children 2.06
(1.83)
Marital Status
Never Married 0.44
(0.50)
Widowed 0.23
(0.42)
Divorced 0.20
(0.40)
Cohabitating 0.13
(0.33)
Can Read Kiswahili 0.95
(0.21)
Can Write Kiswahili 0.88
(0.33)
Tribe
Luo 0.51
(0.50)
Luhya 0.39
(0.49)
HIV Knowledge Test Score (0-1 Scale) 0.94
(0.06)
Vaginal Sex 0.94
(0.10)
Income from Sex Work per Day (Ksh) 850.71
(460.99)
Hours in Sex Work per Day 7.35
(2.40)
Income from Other Work per Day (Ksh) 106.08
(120.14)
Hours in Other Work per Day 7.73
(39.33)
Hourly Wage from Sex Work (Ksh) 151.77
(92.24)
Hourly Wage from Other Work (Ksh) 41.07
(38.54)
Observations 192
Note: Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses.
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7.2 Table 2: Client Information
Summary Statistics
Disutility for Condoms 0.45
(0.45)
Disutility for Condoms for Unrisky Clients 0.21
(0.38)
Risky Clients 0.46
(0.46)
Uncircumcised Clients 0.25
(0.40)
Poor Clients 0.09
(0.26)
Clean Clients 0.62
(0.44)
Handsome Clients 0.54
(0.46)
Tribe
Luhya 0.25
(0.40)
Luo 0.24
(0.39)
Kikuyu 0.14
(0.32)
Teso 0.09
(0.26)
Kalenjin 0.06
(0.22)
Somali 0.06
(0.23)
Akamba 0.05
(0.21)
Ugandan 0.04
(0.17)
Occupation
Government 0.27
(0.41)
Truck Driver 0.19
(0.36)
Business 0.19
(0.36)
Hotel 0.10
(0.27)
Shop 0.09
(0.26)
Boda Boda (Bike Taxi) Driver 0.08
(0.25)
Bar 0.05
(0.20)
Other 0.03
(0.16)
Observations 3,656
Note: Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses.
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7.3 Table 3: Sexual Transactions
Summary Statistics
Price for Sexual Transaction (Ksh) 509.51
(286.41)
Unprotected Vaginal Sex 0.08
(0.14)
STI 0.03
(0.07)
STI Risk 0.03
(0.10)
Birth Control 0.60
(0.49)
Menstruation Today 0.08
(0.06)
Menstruation Yesterday 0.09
(0.06)
Pregnancy Risk 0.001
(0.01)
Observations 192
Note: Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses.
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7.4 Table 4: STI Risk as a Source of the Price Premium for Unpro-
tected Sex
STI Risk as a Source of the Price Premium for Unprotected Sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ksh Ksh Ksh Ksh
No Condom -4.263 1.325
(31.17) (30.12)
Risky Client -10.95 -3.104
(26.02) (27.16)
No Condom*Risky Client 128.9* 142.7** 138.5* 143.4*
(72.20) (68.87) (74.98) (77.80)
Sex Worker Controls No Yes No Yes
Client Controls No Yes No Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 574.8*** 609.8*** 578.0*** 609.8***
(75.16) (78.59) (75.98) (79.02)
Kshse 588.1 590 588.1 590
Sexual Transactions 2506 2378 2506 2378
R-Squared 0.00915 0.0203 0.00926 0.0203
F Statistic 1.593 4.534 1.523 4.258
Notes:
a. Standard errors clustered at the sex worker level in parentheses.
b. *** 1% level of confidence.
c. ** 5% level of confidence.
d. * 10% level of confidence.
e. Mean of Ksh.
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7.5 Table 5: Pregnancy Risk as a Source of the Price Premium for
Unprotected Sex
Pregnancy Risk as a Source of the Price Premium for Unprotected Sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ksh Ksh Ksh Ksh
No Condom 32.02 4.063
(37.66) (26.32)
Probability of Pregnancy 319.2 514.1**
(267.4) (230.1)
Probability of Pregnancy*No Birth Control -368.1 -992.9**
(447.3) (413.4)
No Condom*Probability of Pregnancy*No Birth Control 714.6* 708.8** 499.6 716.0**
(363.5) (292.3) (433.2) (349.6)
Sex Worker Controls No Yes No Yes
Client Controls No Yes No Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 536.5*** 654.3*** 493.2*** 641.2***
(53.38) (151.1) (63.89) (154.4)
Kshse 553.7 536.8 553.7 536.8
Sexual Transactions 6361 3493 6361 3493
R-Squared 0.00282 0.0133 0.00345 0.0148
F Statistic 1.301 1.902 1.449 2.068
Notes:
a. Standard errors clustered at the sex worker level in parentheses.
b. *** 1% level of confidence.
c. ** 5% level of confidence.
d. * 10% level of confidence.
e. Mean of Ksh.
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7.6 Table 6: Clients’ Disutility for Condoms as a Source of the Price
Premium for Unprotected Sex
Clients’ Disutility for Condoms as a Source of the Price Premium for Unprotected Sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ksh Ksh Ksh Ksh
No Condom 66.79* 76.21**
(37.81) (38.04)
Disutility 14.34 6.565
(18.74) (21.12)
No Condom*Disutility 29.59 -4.568 -31.50 -69.94
(64.81) (62.70) (76.70) (82.25)
Sex Worker Controls No Yes No Yes
Client Controls No Yes No Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 523.6*** 493.1*** 511.7*** 483.0***
(69.61) (99.28) (69.32) (101.6)
Kshse 563.9 565.9 563.9 565.9
Sexual Transactions 3196 3011 3196 3011
R-Squared 0.00628 0.0135 0.00779 0.0152
F Statistic 2.516 4.645 2.424 5.382
Notes:
a. Standard errors clustered at the sex worker level in parentheses.
b. *** 1% level of confidence.
c. ** 5% level of confidence.
d. * 10% level of confidence.
e. Mean of Ksh.
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7.7 Table 7: STI Risk and Pregnancy Risk as Sources of the Price
Premium for Unprotected Sex
STI Risk and Pregnancy Risk as Sources of the Price Premium for Unprotected Sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ksh Ksh Ksh Ksh
No Condom -33.22 -31.02
(36.87) (42.79)
Risky Client -19.55 -15.35
(25.89) (27.04)
No Condom*Risky Client 76.31 71.70 101.8 92.41
(73.70) (69.77) (82.20) (86.08)
Probability of Pregnancy 650.0** 649.4**
(292.9) (267.1)
Probability of Pregnancy*No Birth Control -1071.9** -961.3*
(478.6) (507.6)
No Condom*Probability of Pregnancy*No Birth Control 593.7 667.7 801.5* 860.9
(399.8) (438.4) (479.8) (565.7)
Sex Worker Controls No Yes No Yes
Client Controls No Yes No Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 498.0*** 533.3*** 476.5*** 501.6***
(91.37) (153.5) (100.1) (153.2)
Kshse 589.1 591.7 589.1 591.7
Sexual Transactions 2246 2133 2246 2133
R-Squared 0.0123 0.0233 0.0152 0.0258
F Statistic 2.514 4.062 2.881 4.614
Notes:
a. Standard errors clustered at the sex worker level in parentheses.
b. *** 1% level of confidence.
c. ** 5% level of confidence.
d. * 10% level of confidence.
e. Mean of Ksh.
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7.8 Table 8: Instrumental Variable with Uncircumcised Clients as In-
strument for STI Risk
IV: Uncircumcised Client as Instrument for STI Risk
(1)
Ksh
No Condom*Risky Client 245.7
(965.7)
Sex Worker Controls Yes
Client Controls Yes
Time Dummies Yes
Constant 923.8***
(266.2)
Kshse 594.6
Sexual Transactions 2331
Adjusted R-Squared 0.129
Chi-Squared 150.0
Notes:
a. Standard errors clustered at the sex worker level in parentheses.
b. *** 1% level of confidence.
c. ** 5% level of confidence.
d. * 10% level of confidence.
e. Mean of Ksh.
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7.9 Table 9: Is STI Risk Endogenous?
Null Hypothesis: STI Risk is Exogenous
STI Risk
Robust Chi2 (1) 0.126783
(0.7218)
Robust F (1, 2316) 0.125192
(0.7235)
Note:
a. P-values in parentheses.
b. Uncircumcised clients used as instrument, with CSW, Client and Time Controls.
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7.10 Table 10: Placebo Test
Placebo Test: Pregnancy Risk for Sex Workers on Birth Control
(1)
Ksh
No Condom*Probability of Pregnancy 1727.77
(1198.1)
Sex Worker Controls Yes
Client Controls Yes
Time Dummies Yes
Fixed Effects Yes
Constant 546.0***
(96.3)
Sexual Transactions 2236
R-Squared 0.0039
F-Statistic 1.83
Notes:
a. Standard errors clustered at the sex worker level in parentheses.
b. *** 1% level of confidence.
c. ** 5% level of confidence.
d. * 10% level of confidence.
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7.11 Table 11: Instrumental Variable with Probability of Pregnancy
as Instrument for Pregnancy Risk
IV: Probability of Pregnancy as Instrument for Pregnancy Risk
(1)
Ksh
No Condom*Probability of Pregnancy*No Birth Control 2204.5
(11109.6)
Sex Worker Controls Yes
Client Controls Yes
Time Dummies Yes
Constant 582.2
(390.7)
Kshe 536.8
Sexual Transactions 3493
Adjusted R-Squared 0.100
Chi-Squared 117.0
Notes:
a. Standard errors clustered at the sex worker level in parentheses.
b. *** 1% level of confidence.
c. ** 5% level of confidence.
d. * 10% level of confidence.
e. Mean of Ksh.
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7.12 Table 12: Is Pregnancy Risk Endogenous?
Is Pregnancy Risk Endogenous?
Null Hypothesis: Pregnancy Risk is Exogenous
Pregnancy Risk
Robust Chi2 (1) 0.514959
(0.4730)
Robust F (1, 3525) 0.513386
(0.4737)
Note:
a. P-values in parentheses.
b. Probability of pregnancy used as instrument, with sex worker, client and time controls.
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7.13 Table 13: Pregnancy Knowledge
Are Sex Workers Knowledgeable About Pregnancy?
(1)
Birth Control
HIV Knowledgee 0.529
(0.986)
Sex Worker Controls Yes
Client Controls Yes
Time Dummies Yes
Constant -0.723
(0.938)
Sexual Transactions 3775
R-Squared 0.277
F-Statistic 3.946
Notes:
a. Standard errors clustered at the sex worker level in parentheses.
b. *** 1% level of confidence.
c. ** 5% level of confidence.
d. * 10% level of confidence.
e. HIV Knowledge Test Score (0-1 Scale).
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B.1 Proof
B.2 Of the Proposition
Proof. Let P1 − P2 > 0 so that the price premium for unprotected sex exists. This
implies that GCg + SCs > 0.
Let SCs = 0.
Now, if P1 − P2 > 0 and SCs = 0, then it is trivially shown that GCg > 0 auto-
matically, but it can also be shown deductively because the product of two numbers
can be positive only if both are positive or both are negative. Since the lower bound
on a probability is zero then G can at minimum only be zero. And since we know that
GCg > 0 and it cannot be < 0 then it must be positive. And since G is positive, then
so too must Cg be positive.
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